CONDITIONAL SALES IN PENNSYLVANIA SINCE THE
ADOPTION OF THE SALES ACT.

I.
It is necessary, at the outset, to define and limit the term,
"conditional sale." A conditional sale, as considered in this
article, is a contract to sell, which provides fhat the goods are
to be delivered into the possession of the vendee, but that title
in the goods is to remain in the vendor until full payment of
the .purchase price. Throughout this article the term, "conditional sale," will refer exclusively to such a contract. The
purpose of .this article is to ascertain whether or not the Sales
Act has changed the law of conditional sales as it existed in
Pennsylvania before the adoption of that act. Or, to put the
question in another form, since the adoption of the Sales Act
in Pennsylvania, can a vendor enforce the condition in a contract of conditional sale, reserving title in himself until full
payment of the purchase price, against third. parties after delivery
of the goods to the conditional vendee?
The general principle of the common law, which was early
adopted in Pennsylvania, was that in a sale of goods the venThe
dor could convey only such title as he actually had.'
question naturally arose whether a conditional vendee who had
come into possession of goods under a contract of conditional
sale would fall under this general rule. Could a conditional
vendee, in possession of goods under a contract of conditional.
sale, only convey such title in the goods as he had? The courts
of Pennsylvania very early answered this question in the negative. Briefly stated, their answer was that the condition reserving title in the vendor until full payment of the purchase
price, while good and enforceable as between the original parties,
was unenforceable against creditors of, or biona fide purchasers
'Hosack v. Weaver, T Yeates 478 (Pa. 1795); Hardy v. Metzgar, 2
Yeates 347 (Pa. i798) ; Lecky v. McDermott, 8 S. & L 5oo (Pa. 1822); Rapp
v. Palmer, 3 Watts 178 (Pa. 1834); McMahon v. Sloan, 12 Pa. 2:29 (1849);
Kusenberg v. Browne, 42 Pa. 173 (1862).
(123)
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from, the conditional vendee.2 This rule of law was so well
established that nothing is to be gained by merely showing that
such was the law of Pennsylvania prior to the adoption of the
Sales Act. This article will, therefore, be primarily directed to
an attempt to show how the Pennsylvania courts reached such
a conclusion; and then to determine whether the Sales Act has
changed the law of Pennsylvania in this respect.
RIGHTS OF A CREDITOR OF A CONDITIONAL VENDEE.

Martin v. Mathiot,3 decided in 1826, was the first case
that arose in Pennsylvania necessitating a decision as to the
enforceability of the condition, reserving title in the vendor
under. a contract of conditional sale, against a third party after
the transfer of the possession of the goods to the conditional
vendee. This was an action of trespass, brought against Mathiot, a sheriff, for levying on certain goods as the property of.
one Michael. The evidence showed that the goods were sold
and delivered by the plaintiff to Michael, with the stipulation
that title was to remain in the plaintiff until the price was paid.
Under a wvrit of execution Mathiot had levied upon and sold
the goods as the property of Michael. The lower court entered
judgment for the defendant, because it was of the opinion, "if
vendor and vendee agree, that the possession shall pass to the
vendee, but the property remain in the vendor, until the whole
purchase money is paid, such agreement, as respects creditors
and the sheriff, is fraudulent." On appeal, the Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the lower court. The following quotation froin the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Tilghman will
show the reasoning of the court, whereby such a conclusion
was reached:
"All the world has a right to suppose that he (Michael)
was the owner of the horses which he drove, and a secret
'See Martin v. Mathiot, T4 S. & R. 214 (Pa.
(1845); Chamberlain v. Smith, 44 Pa. 43T
Pa. 26 (iS65): Haak v. Linderman & Skeer, 64
Huntsman & Co., 92 Pa. 53 (1879); Brunswick
Pa. 5o8 (188o).
* 14 S. & R. 214 (Pa. 1826).
19o

1826); Rose v. Story, r Pa.
(863); Rowe v. Sharp, 51
Pa. 499 (87o); Stadfeld v.
& Balke Co. v. Hoover, 95
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agreement to the contrary was an injury to society, by giving the wagoner a false credit which might induce others
to trust him with their property. The cases which have
generally been brought before courts of justice are those
in which the seller has remained in possession. Those have
been adjudged fraudulent. There are innumerable authorities on this subject, but I will refer particularly to Clow v.
Woods, 5 Serg. & Rawle 286, and Babb v. Clemson, io
Serg. & Rawle 419, because they were in this court, well
considered, and recently decided. The principle which governed them was that a sale, where possession does not accompany and follow it, is fraudulent as to creditors. It
was the separation of the possession from the property which
made the fraud: and the principle applies to the case before
us. Here the seller did not retain the possession, but was
to retain the property after he had transferred the possession to the buyer. The mischief is the same-a false credit
is given; and whether given to the buyer or seller, is immaterial."
From this quotation it is seen that the court considered a
conditional sale analogous to a sale with retention of possession
of the goods by the vendor after the sale. Both of these transactions were considered fraudulent by the court as to creditors;
and for the same reason, viz., because of the separation of the
possession and the title. The principle of law that made retention of possession by the vendor after the sale fraudulent
as against creditors of the vendor, also rendered, in the opinion
of the court, the condition in a contract of conditional sale,
reserving title in the vendor until full payment of the purchase
price, fraudulent and unenforceable against creditors of the conditional vendee. It is necessary, therefore, to determine why
retention of the possession of goods by the vendor, after their
sale, was held to preclude the vendee from asserting his title in
the goods against creditors of the vendor who had levied on
the goods.
Clow v. W17oods, 4 cited in Martin v. Math ot,5 is the leading case in Pennsylvania on this point. One Hancock was the
45

S. & R. 275 (Pa. i~r8).

'Note 3, supra.
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owner of certain goods. He gave the plaintiff, Clow, a mortgage on the goods. This mortgage was not recorded, and Hancock continued in possession of the goods. One Poe became a
judgment creditor of Hancock. Upon a writ of execution being issued on this judgment, Woods, as sheriff, levied on the
goods as the property of Hancock. Clow thereupon brought
this action of trespass against Woods. Upon the above facts
appearing as a special case stated, judgnent was entered for the
defendant by the lower court. On appeal, the Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the lower court. The following excerpt from Mr. Justice Gibson's opinion indicates the basis for
the court's decision:
"The Stat. 13 Eliz. does not, in words, declare a conveyance of goods fraudulent, where the vendor retains
possession; but in general terms renders void all conveyances made to the end, purpose, and intent of defrauding
creditors. Hence it becomes incumbent on the Courts t6
determine, from all the circumstances of the case,- whether
the conveyance be, or be not, made with a fraudulent intention; and in judging of that, it is held, that any neglect
in leaving the vendor in possession is fraudulent within the
statute."
As shown above, in Clow v. Woods,6 creditors of a vendor, who had retained possession of the goods after the sale,
were given the right to levy upon the goods by the statute of
Elizabeth. Therefore, when the court decided, in Martin v.
Mathiot,7 that the same reason that gave creditors of a vendor
in possession of goods after the sale the right to levy on the
goods, likewise gave creditors of a conditional vendee, who was
in possession of goods under a contract of conditional sale, the
right to levy on the goods, this right of creditors of a conditional vendee was actually based on the statute of 13 Elizabeth.
In other words, creditors of a conditional vendee were allowed
to levy on goods in the vendee's possession, under a contract of
conditional sale, because the Pennsylvania court considered that
*'Note
Note 4, supra.
3, up-ra.
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the statute of 13 Elizabeth gave the creditors tbat-right. Or,
to state the proposition in another manner, a conditional vendor
was not allowed to assert his title against creditors of the conditional vendee, who had levied on the goods, while in the latter's possession, because the court considered that the statute
of Elizabeth precluded the conditional vendor from doing so.
It is now proper to ascertain whether this construction of
the statute of Elizabeth by the Pennsylvania court is correct.
That part of the statute of 13 Elizabeth that is essential to the
question at issue is as follows:
"I. For the avoiding and abolishing of feigned, covinous, and fraudulent feoffments, gifts, grants, alienations,
conveyances, bonds, suits, as well of lands and tenements
as of goods and chattels-devised and contrived of malice,
fraud, covin, collusion or guile, to the end, purpose and.
intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors and others of
their just and lawful actions, suits, debts, accounts. ...
"II. Be it therefore declared, ordained and enactedThat all and every feoffment, gift, grant, alienation, bargain and conveyances of lands, tenements, hereditaments,
goods and chattels-had or made, to or for any intent or
purpose before declared and expressed, shall be from henceforth deemed and taken (only as against that person or
persons, his or their heirs, successors, executors, administrators and assigns-whose actions, suits, debts--shall-be
in any ways disturbed, hindered, delayed or defrauded) to
be clearly and utterly void, frustrate and of none effect." s
Briefly stated, this statute provides that all sales made by
a debtor, with the intent 'and purpose of defrauding his creditors, are void as regards such creditors. Or to state its effect
in another form, when a vendor attempts to defraud his creditors by fraudulent sales, the creditors of such vendor may
treat the sales as void, unless the rights of some innocent party
have intervened. The statute, however, does not touch or con13 Elizabeth c. 5 (6 Statutes at Large 268). This act was made perpetual by the statute of 29 Elizabeth c. 5 (6 Statutes at Large 391). Section
VI of the act protects a bona fide purchaser for value and prevents the act
from being applied so as to upset his title in the property. It gtipulates that
this act shall not be applied so as to defeat the estate or interest acquired by
any person as a bona fide purchaser for value.
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cern creditors of a vendee at all. Creditors of'a vendor are
the only creditors that the statute of Elizabeth affects.
In Clow v. Woods,0 the Pennsylvania court applied the statute of Elizabeth correctly. Having held that retention of possession of the goods after the sale by the vendor is fraudulent
as a matter of law, the court correctly decided that the statute
of Elizabeth made the sale void insofar as creditors of the vendor were concerned. In Martin v. Afathlot,10 however, an entirely different construction was given to the statute. In this
case the court construed the case of Clow v. Woods,"' and thus
ultimately the statute of Elizabeth, since this statute was the
basis of that decision, as establishing the broad proposition that
"a sale, where possession does not accompany and follow it,
is fraudulent as to creditors. It was the separation of the possession from the property which made the fraud." It has been
seen that the statute of 13 Elizabeth did not establish any such
rule of law; and that the court in Clow v. Woods 22 did not
interpret the statute as establishing any such proposition. Furthermore, in Martin v. Mathiot,1 3 the statute of Elizabeth, which
declared fraudulent sales void as regards creditors, *was construed as declaring a fraudulent sale, not void, but valid; f6r
only by considering the conditional sale a valid sale, can creditors of the vendee levy on the goods. The Pennsylvania court,
therefore, in basing the right of creditors of a conditional vendee to levy on the goods in the latter's possession under a
contract of conditional sale upon the statute of 13 Elizabeth,
misinterpreted the effect and scope of that statute 1 4
Note 4, supra.
"Note 3, spra.

"Note 4, supra.
Note 4, supra.
" Note 3, supra.
"That

the Statute of 13 Elizabeth is the real basis for the Pennsylvania.

rule of conditional sales, insofar as creditors of the conditional vendee are
concerned, is confirmed by later decisions. See Rowe v. Sharp, note 2, supra;

Dando v. Foulds, ioS Pa. 74 (xi&4); Edwards' Appeal, 1o5 Pa. 103 (1884).
A careful search through the English cases has failed to reveal any
instance where the English courts applied the statute of Elizabeth to a contract of conditional sale; or even *'vhere a litigant contended that the statute
should be so applied, so that the court was compelled to consider the question.
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RIGHTS OF A BONA FIDE PURCHASER FRO.M A CONDITIONAL
VENDEE

The rights of a bona fide purchaser from a conditional
vendee will now be considered. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had been clearly indicating, by way of dictum, in a
number of cases,15 that it considered the same reason that made
a conditional sale fraudulent and void as regards creditors of
the conditional vendee, also applicable so as to invalidate and
make void the condition in such a sale as regards bona fide purchasers of the goods from the conditional vendee. Finally, in
Sladfeld v. Hiuntsman & Co.,"0 the court squarely affined its
prior dicta as law. Huntsman & Co. had delivered furniture to
one Carpenter under an agreement which the lower court held
was a contract of bailment. Carpenter subsequently sold and
delivered the furnituie to Stadfeld, who was an innocent purchaser for value. Huntsman & Co. immediately brought an
action of replevin against Stadfeld for the goods. The lower
court, holding that the original transaction was a contract of
bailment, allowed Huntsman & Co. to recover the goods. The
Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower court. It held the
original transaction.to be a conditional sale, and that, as a
consequence, Stadfeld acquired a good title to the goods. To
quote:
"It has long been an established rule in Pennsylvania,
that a sale and delivery of personal property, with an agreement that the ownership shall remain in the vendor until
the purchase-money is paid, is fraudulent and. void as to
the creditors of the vendee, and innocent purchasers....
The force of the argument for the plaintiff was spent in
showing that a case of bailment is not within the rule laid
down for conditional sales. The principle is conceded, but
it has failed in showing the existence of a bailment. On
the contrary it was a sale, and comes directly within the
ruling of Clow zv Woods, 5 S. & R. 275; Babb v. Clemson,
io Id. 419; Martin v. Mathiot, I4 Id. 214; Jenkins v. Eichelberger, 4 Watts 121; Rose v. Story, I Barr 19o; Mitchell
v. Story, i Pa. i9o (1845); Chamberlain v. Smith, note 2, supra;
Rowe v. Sharp, note 2, supra.
2SRose

i92 Pa. 53 (1879).
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v. Comntonwetalth to use, i Wright 187; IWaldron v. Haupt,
2 P. F. Smith 408; Haak v. Linderman, 14 P. F. Smith
499, and similar cases."
From this quotation it is seen that the Pennsylvania court
considered that a bona fide purchaser secured a good title to
goods, purchased from a conditional vendee in possession of the
goods under a contract of conditional sale, -for the same reason
that a creditor of a conditional vendee could levy on goods in
the latter's possession under a contract of conditional sale. The
language of the Pennsylvania court, down to the Stadfeld case," 7
had consistently indicated that such was the law in Pennsylvania. Finally in that case, when called upon for a decision
on the question, the prior dicta were affirmed. In this case,
Clon, v. Woods 18 and Martin v. Matlhiot,"9 and cases following them, were cited as authority for the 'decision and the proposition of law laid down by the court. It has been seen that all
of these cases were based upon the statute of 13 Elizabeth. By
giving as authority decisions based on the statute of Elizabeth,
the cotfrt in the Stadfeld case " has, therefore, likewise based
the right of a bona fide purchaser from a conditional vendee to
keep the goods under an indefeasible title, *free from any claims
of the conditional vendor, upon the statute of 13 Elizabeth.
It has been seen that the Pennsylvania court, in Martin v. Mathiot,2 erroneously interpreted the statute of Elizabeth as declaring all sales fraudulent where the possession and the property in the goods were separated. In Stadfcld v. Huntsnan &
Co.,22 therefore, the court merely adopted this interpretation of
the statute, and applied it in favor of a bona fide purchaser -from
23
a conditional vendee.
'Note x6, supra.
,Note 4, supra.
Note 3, supra.

Note i6, supra.
'Note 3, supra.
" Note 16, supra.
" An examination of the statute of 13 Elizabeth shows that the statute
does not apply to purchasers as sudh at all. This point -the Su'reme Court
of Pennsylvania itself decided in Foster v. Walton, 5 Watts 378 (Pa. 1836).
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II
It has been seen that in Pennsylvania, prior to the adoption
of the Sales Act, a creditor of a conditOnal vendee couild levy
on%goods in the litter's gussessioi mner d, 'ontradt of co'diflonal safe as. the protketf of the"coiYifi0iia v lfdee;4 affd
t
boirt fide ptirciaser of goods fto1 d' eoid'f
ifoi '-efdee,'ff'
was in,possessioff of the goods tbn4r, a:Wfo'rff of coMiio f"
sale, acquited d good tile to,stiff gooids% ]tofif of. tfhe8-6 pfopositioils, were see&, fo lave restffed- froi ' flie- iifterprefatin gi,ei
to the statute of r3" Eli2abeth by the Pehfisyfl'aniai courfs'.- i
reTa;ins to be deternined wfether the Sales" Ac has ctfifiged
the above-stated rules of law in-Penfisylvania. Under the Sales
Act can, a conditional vendor enforce the condition in a: contract
of conditional sale, reserving title in himself until ful" paymeiti
of the purchase price, against third persons? Ii is interesting
to note that althoulgh the Sales Act was adbptd if Penisyhania
in r9.Ir5, 24 tljis questio, has neer been- presented: fo an 4liklfate
court of this state for determination.
in discussing this question, the order in Which third parties have been, dealt with- previously in tlis article will be reversed. Tle ri'gl-ts of bona fide puirchasers fron a conditional
vendee wilt be considered, first.
RIGHTS OF A BONA FIDE'.-PURCHASER

FROM1

VE'DE'E UNDER T-HE SALES

A

CONDITIONAL

ACT.

The rights of" purcliases' atle dealt withi hi the Sales Act
in" sections 23, 24.and 25, which will be cotisidered ii reverse
order.
Section 25 concerns only a sale wheid the vendor retains
ppssession- of' the" goods aftei tli sale.
itich.-thf
i6*idor'
i a
conditional, sale does' not- retain possession of the goods, but
possession is transferred to the vendee; section 25 is nbt a:pplicable tb a conti-act of conditional sale:
Section 24 gives a good' title to a bona fide iiurchaser. from
a: person who had a voidable title in the goods.' Unless,, there"Act of May I,

19r5,

P. L. 543.
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fore, a conditional vendee can be held to have a voidable title
in goods in his possession under a contract of conditional sale,
section 24 does not apply to a contract of conditional sale.
Does a conditional vendee have a voidable title in goods
in his possession under a contract of conditional sale, since the
adoption of the Sales Act in Pennsylvania?
Sections i8 and 19 are the sections in the Sales Act t.at
cover the transfer of the property in goods sold. Section 19
lays down various rules for ascertaining the intention of the
parties where the intention of the parties as to the passage of
title does not clearly appear. Since the intention of the parties
as to the passage of title in a contract of conditional sale does
appear, section 19 does not apply. Section 18, therefore, is the
only section applicable to the question of the passage of title in
goods sold under a contract of conditional sale. This section is
as follows:
"Section i8. First. Where there is a contract to sell
specific or ascertained goods, the property in them is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties to the contract intend it to be transferred.
"Second. For the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties, regard shall be had to the terms of the
contract, the conduct of the parties, usages of trade, and
the circumstances of the case."
Section 76 defines "property" as follows:
"'Property' means the general property in goods; and
not merely a special property."
Since Section 18 (i) stipulates that the property shall pass
as the parties to the contract intend, the intention of the parties
controls the transfer of the property in goods under the Sales
Act. Section 18 (2) directs that in ascertaining this intention
regard shall be had "to the terms of the contract, the conduct
of the parties, usages of trade, and .the circumstances of the
case."
By the express terms of. the contract in practically every
conditional sale, title is expressly reserved in the vendor until
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full payment of the purchase price. In addition, there can
be no doubt but that in every contract of conditional sale the
parties actually intend that title is to remain in the vendor until
full payment of the price. Under section i8, therefore, effect
must be given to this intention. It must be held that the "property" in the goods has not passed to the conditional vendee; and
that the title to the goods remains in the vendor until the price
is paid. It is admitted that the contract of conditional sale passes
an interest in the goods to the vendee. The point that it is
wished to make is, however, that the contract does not pass the
general property in the goods to the conditional vendee, nor does
he have a title, voidable or otherwise, in the goods merely because he is in possession of them under a contract of conditional
sale.2 5 Since, therefore, a conditional vendee does not have a
voidable title to the goods, section 24 has no application to a
contract of conditional sale.
It is seen that any rights that a bona fide purchaser from
a conditional vendee may acquire cannot be based on sections
24 or 25. Section 23, therefore, must govern the question as
to what title a bona fide purchaser from a conditional vendee will
acquire. This section is as follows:
"Section 23. First. Subject to the provisions of this
act, where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner
thereof, and who does not sell them under the authority or
with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better
title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of
the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the
seller's authority to sell.
"Second. Nothing in this act, however, shall affect"(a) The provisions of any- factors' acts, recording
acts, or any enactment enabling the apparent owner of
"Furthermore, the term "voidable sale" has a definite meaning in the law

of sales. It means a contract under which the vendor intended to pass title
to the goods to the vendee; but because of fraud on the part of either the
vendor or the vendee, or of both, the vendee has not acquired an indefeasible
title. It is perfectly clear that a conditional sale does not fall within this
definition, since the conditional vendor has no intention of transferring title
in the goods to the conditional vendee when he delivers the goods to the

vendee, but only when the price has been fully paid.
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goods to dispose of them as if he were the true owner
thereof:
"(b) The validity of any contract to sell or sale under
any special common law or statutory power of sale, or
under the order of a court of competent jurisdiction."
Section 23 (2) will be considered first. Subsection 23 (2a)
deals with "factors' acts, recording acts, or any -enactment enabling the apparent owner of goods to dispose of them as if he were
the true owner thereof." This provision does not affect the question at issue, since it deals only. with statutory provisions, of
which there are none in Pennsylvania. Furthermore, as will be
shown later, a conditional vendee is not the "apparent" .owner
of goods in his possession under a contract of conditional sale.
Subsection 23 (2b) provides that ail statutory or common
law powers of sale shall remain as heretofore. This provision
does not apply to conditional sales, unless it be held that a conditional vendee had a power of sale in Pennsylvania prior to
the adoption of the Sales Act, within the meaning and intent of
the word "power" as used in this subsection of the Act. HoW~
is the word "power" used in this subsection? It is admitted
that the word "power" is often used to designate a mental ability or capacity, or a physical ability or capacity, to do a certain
act, whether it be lawful or unlawful for the person to do that
particular act. It is submitted, however, that the word "power"
is not used in this subsection in this broad sense. On the other
hand, the word "power" is used in subsection 23 (2b) only to
designate a mental or physical ability or capacity to do a certain
act, which it is lawful for the person to do.
An examination of section 23 shows that this section was
drafted with the distinction between an tmlawful and a lawful
ability or capacity to do certain acts in mind; and 'that the word
"power" was used advisedly to designate only the latter class of
acts. Subsection 23 (2a) preserves the pre-existing statutory
ability which certain persons had, to convey a good title to goods
which they did not own. The exercise of this ability, however,
is unlawful, in the sense that the person exercising it is liable
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to the real owner of the goods in damag'es. Then subsection 23
preserves the pre-existing power that certdin persons had
prior to the Adoption of the Act to give a good title to goodswhich they did- not owi: The pdrson; however,- who*exercisesthis power of sale is not liMae to6 dhhtag's,tb-' tii real' 6Afie 6f(
the goods for his, exercise- of,this, power.
Since subsection 23' (2b) is a verbatii,' c6py of' stabsection
2-I. (2b), of tfl!English Sale of Goods Act'-2 ifis proper to
ascertain the purpose and' intent of this provision in' the English
Act. This is especially so, in view of thd fa fttat the Anierican
Act is modeled after the English Act. 'Mr. Chaliners,-the draftsman of the English Act, comments on' this provision as follows:
(2b)

erson is sometimes invested by lav with a special power to dispose of another person's property. For instance, a pawnbroker may sell unredeemed pledges; and a
landlord, who has duly distrained for rent, may sell the
goods so distrained. So, too, the master of a ship may,
in case of necessity, dispose of the ship'and cargo." 27
-"One

This quotation shows quite clearly that the word "power"
is used in the section only in the sense above indicated.
The following example will illustrate not only the scope
of this subsection, but also the- necessity for its existence in the
Act. If a sheriff levied on the goods of A, in order to satisfy
a judgment against A, the vendee of the goods at the sheriff's
sale secured a good title to the goods prior to the adoption of
the Act. The sheriff had a power of sale if this case, which
subsection 23 (2b) preserves. Without this provision in the
Act, the title that a vendee, of goods, sold at a sheriff's sale,
acquired, would be controlled by subsection 23 (I).
The result would be that,. if this subsectiorn were strictly applied, such
a vendee would be held to have no title' in the goods. Subsection 23 (2b) was, therefore, inserted to prevent such a result.
' The draftsman of the American Sales Act says of section 23: "This
follows section 21 of the English Act, except -in (2a) 'recording acts' has
been added."'
'Chalmers, Sale of Goods (8th Ed.), p. 66, and cases there cited. See
also in this connection pp. 65 and 67 of the same volume; also 25 Laws of

England, sec. 342.
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Since, therefore, the word "power" in subsection 23 (2b)
means only a lawful power to sell, this provision has no application to a contract of conditional sale. As thus defined, a conditional vendee in Pennsylvania, prior to the adoption of the
Sales Act, did not have a power of sale of goods in his possession under a contract of conditional sale. True it is, he had
an ability to sell the goods to a bona fide purchaser; but he had
no power of sale-no lawful right to .make the sale. The preexisting law in Pennsylvania, therefore, relating to the question
of the title that a bona fide purchaser from a conditional vendee acquires, to goods which were in the latter's possession under
a contract of conditional sale, cannot be considered as still preserved by virtue of subsection 23 (2b) of the Sales Act.
The title, therefore, that a bona fide purchaser from a conditional vendee acquires must be governed by subsection 23 (i).
Since the conditional vendor (owner) does not authorize the
sale, the title that a bona fide purchaser from a conditional vendee acquires is governed by the provision in this section that,
"Where goods are sold by a person who is not the
owner thereof, . . . the buyer acquires no better title to the
goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is
by his conduct precluded from denying the seller's authority to sell."
Under this provision a vendee acquires only the title of
his vendor, unless the real owner has estopped himself from
asserting his title. Applying this rule to a contract of conditional sale, the result is that, unless a conditional vendor has
estopped himself from asserting his title, he can enforce the
condition in the contract of conditional sale, reserving title in
himself until full payment of the purchase price, against a bona
fide purchaser from the conditional vendee. It is necessary,
therefore, to ascertain whether a conditional vendor can be held
to have estopped himself from asserting his title in goods delivered to a conditional vendee under a contract of conditional
sale against a bona fide purchaser from the conditional vendee.
It is to be noted that the conditional vendor can only be held
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to be estopped from asserting his title as against a bona fide
purchaser from the conditional vendee, if the conditional vendor has clothed the conditional vendee with the apparent ownership of the goods. For, although one may clothe another with
the apparent right to sell goods as agent or as owner, it is per-.
fectly clear that in the case of a conditional sale, this appa'rent
right to sell is limited to an apparent right by the conditional
vendee to sell the goods as owner.
Can a conditional vendor be considered as clothing the conditional vendee with the apparent ownership of the goods, by
delivering the goods into the possession of the vendee under a
contract of conditional sale? Will such an act on the part of
a conditional vendor estop him from asserting his title against
a bona fide purchaser from the conditional vendee?
In order to estop a person from denying the truth of a
certain fact it is not only necessary to show, (i) that the third
party actually relied on the conduct of the person sought to be
estopped as establishing the existence of that fact, 28 but also,
(2) that the third party had the right, on reasonable grounds,to rely on the conduct of the party sought to be estopped as
establishing the existence of that fact.2 Therefore, in order
to estop a conditional vendor from asserting his title against
a bona fide purchaser from the conditional vendee, it is not only
necessary to show that the purchaser relied-on some act of the

conditional vendor as giving the conditional vendee the apparent

ownership of the goods, but also that the purchaser had the
right, on reasonable grounds, to rely on this act of the conditional vendor as establishing the ownership of the goods in the
conditional vendee.
o Waters' Appeal, 39 Pa. 523 (i86o); Weist v. Grant, 71 Pa. 95 (1872);
Comegys v. Russell, 175 Pa. z66, 34 Atl. 657 (z896); Stanton v. Estey Mfg.
Co., go Mich. 12, 51 N. IV. ior (1892); Skillern v. Arkansas Woolen Mills,
77 Ark. 172, 91 S. W. 303 (1905); Mott v. German Hospital, 55 N. J. Eq.
722, 37 At. 757 (1897) ; Barnard v. Campbell, 55 N. Y. 456 (1874).
Parker v. Moore, 59 N. H. 44 (1879) ; Rogers v. P. & B. Ry., zoo Ate.
86, 6o Atl. 73 (r9o5); Holt v. N. t. Tel. & Tel. Co., iio Me. io, 85 AtL
159 (1913); see also, Pence v. Arbuckle, 22 Minn. 417 (876); Western Land
Ass'n v. Banks, So Minn. 317, 83 N. NV. 192 (igoo); De Lashmutt v. Teetor,
261 Mo. 412, i69 S. W. 34 (1914); Besson v. Eveland, 26 N. J. Eq. 468
(1875); Central R. R. of N. J. v." McCartney, 68 N. J. L. 165, 52 AtM 575
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The only possible act of the conditional vendor, which it
might be claimed has estopped him 'from asserting his title in
the goods against a bona fide purchaser from the conditional
vendee, is the act of transferring the possession of the goods
to the conditional vendee. This is the only act which is the
result of a contract of conditional sale, upon which an estoppel
can be based. This act, however, does not give anyone the right
to believe that the conditional vendee is the owner of the goods,
so as to estop the conditional vendor from asserting his title in
the goods. It is clear that the mere transfer of the possession

of goods, without anything more appearing to the world, does
not give a third person the right to believe that the person in
possession is the owner of the goods, so as to estop the real
owner from asserting his title in the goods. The transfer of
the possession of goods to a servant, or agent, or bailee, does
not estop the owner of the goods from asserting his title therein.
Time and time again the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
allowed a bailor of goods to assert his title against innocent
third parties.30 Said the court in one case:
"A bailment for hire makes it possible for a dishonest bailee to sell the goods to an innocent purchaser, but
such a sale will not pass the title of the bailor, for he has
done or omitted nothing that should estop him from asserting his ownership of the goods." 3'
Yet the appearance of a bailment and'a conditional sale is
exactly the same to third persons. In both cases all that appears
to the world, and on which a third party could rely as establishing the ownership of the goods in the person in possession, is
the transfer of the possession of the goods from one person to
another. It must follow, therefore, that if the transfer of the
possession of the goods to the bailee does not estop the bailor
from asserting his title, it cannot be held to estop the conditional
S* Chamberlain v. Smith, 4s Pa. 43T (i863); Becker v. Smith, 59 Pa. 469
(868); Enlow v. Klein, 79 Pa. 448 (1875); Dando v. Foulds, io5 Pa. 74
(i884); Ditman v. Cottrell & Sons. .X5Pa. 6o6, 17 Atl. 5o4 (x89g); see also,
for a Superior Court decision, Miller v. Douglas, 32 Pa. Super. 158 (igo6).
1 filler Piano Co. v. Parker, 155 Pa. 208, 2-6Ati. 303 (1893).
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vendor from asserting his title in goods transferred to the possession of the conditional vendee under a contract of conditional
sale. A conditional vendor. therefore, cannot be held to le
estopped from asserting his title in the goods,. delivered to the
conditional vendee under a contract of conditional sale, against
a bona fide purchaser from the conditional vendee.
Since a bona fide purchaser of goods from a conditional
-vendee does not come under any of the exceptions stated in section 23, the title that such vendee acquires is governed by the
general provision of this section. This is, that a vendee acquires
only his vendor's title. The result is. that a bona fidc purchaser
from a conditional vendee acquires only the latter's title in the
goods. It follows, therefore, that under the Sales Act a conditional vendor can enforce his title in goods, delivered into the
possession of the conditional vendee under the contract of conditional sale, against a bona fide purchaser of the goods from
the conditional vendee, while the goods were in the latter's
possession.
A comparison of the American Sales Act with the English
Sale of Goods Act confirms the correctness of the conclusion
reached above. Section 23 of the Sales Act is a copy of section 21 of the English Sale of Goods Act 3 2 in its essential provisions.", The English Act, however, contains .subsections 25
(2) and 25 (3); but there are no provisions similar to these
to be found in the American Act. These subsections are as
follows:
"(2) Where a person, having bought or agreed to
buy goods, obtains, with the consent of the seller, possession of the goods or the documents of title to the goods,
the delivery or transfer by that person, or by a mercantile
agent acting for him, of the goods or documents of title,
under any sale, pledge, or other disposition thereof, to any
person receiving the same in good faith and without notice
of any lien or other right of the original seller in respect
"The Sale of Goods Act, 1893; 56 & 57 Vict.. . 71.
'The

American Act has the added words, "recording acts," in subm

section (2a).

Otherwise the sections in the two acts are the same.
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of the goods, shall have the same effect as if the person
making the delivery or transfer were a mercantile agent
in possession of the goods or documents of title with the
consent of the owner.
"(3) In this section the term 'mercantile agent' has
the same meaning as in the Factors Acts."
Sections i (i)

and

2

(i)

of the English Factors Act U de-

fine a "mercantile agent" and state the effect of a sale by such
an agent of goods lawfully in his possession. These sections
are as follows:
"i

(i)

For the purposes of this Act-

"The expression 'mercantile agent' shall mean a mercantile agent having in the customary course of his business
as such agent authority either to sell goods, or to consign
goods for the purpose of sale, or to buy goods, or-to raise
money on the security of goods.
"'2 (I) Where a mercantile agent is, with the consent
of the owner, in possession of goods or of the documents
of title to goods, any sale, pledge, or oth~er disposition of
the goods, made by him when acting in the ordinary course
of business of a mercantile agent, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be as valid as if he were expressly authorized by the owner of the goods to make the same; provided that the person taking under the disposition acts in
good faith, and has not at the time of the disposition notice
that the person making the disposition has not authority to
make the same."
The effect of these provisions is, among other things, to
give to a bona fide purchaser of goods, in the possession of a
conditional vendee as the result of a contract of conditional sale,
a good title to the goods However, the importance of these
provisions for the purposes of this discussion does not lie so
much in their effect, as in the significance of their existence in
the English Sale of Goods Act. As a result of the English
Factors Act, passed in 1889, a bona fide purchaser from a conditional vendee, in possession of goods under a contract of conUThe Factors Act, 1889; 52 &53 Vict. c. 4S.
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ditional sale, acquired a good title in the goods.3 5 Evidently
desiring to continue this rule of law under the Sale.of Goods
Act, subsections 25 (2) and 25 (3) were inserted in that Act.
The only conclusion to.be drawn from their existence in the
English Act is that the draftsman of that Act considered that
section 21 alone (American section 23) would not give a bona
fidc purchaser from a conditional vendee of goods, in'the latter's possession under a contract of conditional sale, a good
title to the goods. This attitude; therefore, of the English
draftsman as to the effect of section 21 is important in construing the similar provision (section 23) in the American Act.
It confirms the conclusion stated above, that under the Sales
Act, with section 23 as the controlling section, a bona fide purchaser from a conditional vendee of goods in the latter's possession under a contract of conditional sale does not acquire a
good title to the goods, but that, on the contrary, the conditional
vendor can enforce his title in the goods against such purchaser.
RIGHTS OF A CREDITOR OF A CONDITIONAL VENDEE UNDER THE

SALES ACT.

Can a conditional vendor be -held to be precluded from
asserting his title in goods in the possession of a conditional
vendee under a contract of conditional sale, against creditors of
the conditional vendee who have levied on the goods, since the
adoption of the Sales Act in Pennsylvania?
Section 26 is the only section in the Sales Act which specifically concerns creditors. This sedtion provides that, "W'here
a person having sold goods continues in possession of the
goods, or of negotiable documents of title. to the goods, and
such retention of possession is fraudulent in fact or is deemed
fraudulent under any rule of law, a creditor or creditors of
the seller may treat the sale as void."
' This is so by virtue of section 9 of the Factors Act. This section is the
same as subsection 21 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act, except that the words
"or under any agreement for sale, pledge, or other disposition thereof" are
contained only in the Factors Act. This makes that provision somewhat
broader in scope than that of the Sale of Goods Act.
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Since section _26 concerns only the case of retention of
possession of the goods by a vendor after sale, it has no direct
bearing upon the rights of creditors of a conditional vendee,
as in a conditional sale possession is always transferred to the
conditional vendee. This section is of great importance, however, in the question now under discussion, because of the fact
that, except for section 26, the Sales Act is entirely silent about
any special rights of creditors. The Pennsylvania view, that
a creditor of a conditional vendee could levy on goods in the
possession of the latter under a contract of conditional sale as
the property of the conditional vendee, was the distinct minority view on this question in the United States in the absence of
any statute."" Therefore, if the Sales Act, drafted to make
the law% of sales uniform in all jurisdictions adopting it, had
intended to adopt, as the uniform law on this point, the minority or Pennsylvania view, it seems fair to assume that a specific
provision to that effect would have been inserted in ihe Act.
Under these circumstances the existence of section 26, and the
silence of the Act as to any special rights of all other creditors,
is tantamount to a specific clause in the Act rejecting the- Pennsylvania view, which gave creditors of a conditional vendee the
right to levy on goods in the possession of the latter under a
contract of conditional sale as the property of the conditional
vendee.
This view is supported by section 74 of the Sales Act, which'
provides that, "This act shall be so interpreted and construed,
if possible, as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform
the laws of those states which enact it." This section provides
that the Act shall be construed so as to effectuate its general
purpose of uniformity. It has been seen that the Sales Act
has overruled the pre-existing Pennsylvania law insofar as the
title that a bona fide purchaser from a conditional vendee acquires is concerned. It has adopted the view held by the majority of jurisdictions prior to the adoption of the Act
In view of this fact it cannot be argued
on this question.3
'Williston on Sales, sec. 324 et seq.
'Williston

on Sales, sec. 324 et seq.
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that the Act, after specifically rejecting one-half of the minority or Pennsylvania doctrine of conditional sales, insofar as
bona fide purchasers from a conditional vendee are concerned,
has adopted by its silence the other half of the minority or
Pennsylvania view, as regards creditors of a conditional vendee. To so hold would be to overrule the spirit and purpose
of the Act as announced by section 74.
If it were held contrary to the view indicated above, that
creditors of a .conditional vendee can still levy on goods in
the possession of a conditional vendee under a contract of conditional sale as the property of the conditional vendee, the
peculiar result would follow that, under the Sales Act, creditors
of a conditional vendee would be accorded greater rights than
are given to bona fide purchasers from a conditional vendee. A
bona ide purchaser from a conditional vendee would be held
bound by the condition in the contract of conditional sale reserving title in the conditional vendor until full payment of the
purchase price, while a creditor of the conditional vendee would
be held not to be bound by the condition. Furthermore, such a
conclusion can be reached only by indulging in tfie presumption
that the pre-existing law in Pennsylvania, insofar as creditors
of a conditional vendee are concerned, remains unchanged, because the Sales Act does not contain a specific provision to the
contrary. Such a presumption, however, under section 74 of
the Act is not permissible. The provision in this section that
the Act shall be construed so as to effectuate its general purpose of uniformity, counteracts any idea that the Act is merely
a codification of the pre-existing law of any particular jurisdiction. No presumption, therefore, can be properly indulged
in, that the pre-existing law of Pennsylvania, insofar as creditors of a conditional vendee are concerned, has not been
changed by the Act. It must be decided, apart from any such
presunption, whether the Sales Act has enacted as the uniform
law, the minority or Pennsylvania view, insofar as the rights
of creditors of a conditional vendee are concerned. If the question is so approached, and if the Act is so construed, the answer
must be that the Act has not done so.
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Of course, even though ordinarily a creditor might only be
able to levy on his debtor's interest in certain goods, yet- it is
possible for him to acquire greater rights if the real owner of the
goods has estopped himself from asserting his title in the goods
against such creditor. A creditor of a conditional vendee, however, cannot claim that a conditional vendor has estopped himself from asserting his title in the goods against creditors of
the conditional vendee, for the same reasons that prevent a
bona fide purchaser from claiming that the conditional vendor
has estopped himself from asserting his title in the goods against
bona fide purchasers of the goods from the conditional vendee.
These reasons have been discussed at length earlier in this
article.
It is felt advisable to discuss one final provision in the
Sales Act, viz., section 73. This is done, in order to meet any
possible argument that might be made that, by virtue of this
section, the pre-existing Pennsylvania law, insofar as the right
of creditors of a conditional vendee to levy on goods in the latter's possession under a contract of conditional sale as the property of the conditional vendee is concerned, remains unchanged.
This section is as follows: "In any case not provided for in
this act, the rules of law and equity, including the law merchant,
and in particular the rules relating to the law of principal and
agent and to the effect of fraud, misrepresentation, duress or
coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other invalidating cause, shall
continue to apply to contracts to sell and to sales of goods."
It is to be observed that this section applies only "in any
case not provided for, in this act."38 It is submitted, however,
for the reasons given before, that all creditors have been provided for by the Act. In addition, the fraud, about which section 73 speaks, is an "invalidating" fraud, while the fraud, on
which the right of a creditor of a conditional vendee to levy on
" This provision, of course, eliminates any possible application of this
section to the case of a bona fide purchaser from a conditional vendee of
goods in the latter's possession under a contract of conditional sale. All
purchasers, and thus necessarily purchasers from a conditional vendee, are
expressly covered in the Act by sections 23, 24 and 25.
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goods in the latter's possession under a contract of conditional
sate as the property of the conditional vendee, prior to the adoption of the Sales Act in Pennsylvania, was based, was a validating fraud. By it the original sale of the goods 1was not
invalidated, but was held to be a valid sale. Furthermore, it
has been seen that the Pennsylvania courts only considered the
delivery of goods into the possession of a vendee under a contract of conditional sale fraudulent, because of the supposed
statutory direction of the statute of 13 Elizabeth. It has been
seen, however, that this statute does not declare the delivery of
goods into the possession of a vendee under a contract of conditional sale fraudulent. The only basis for declaring such a
transaction fraudulent disappears; and the pre-existing law in
Pennsylvania, insofar as creditors of a conditional vendee are
concerned, cannot be held by virtue of section 73 to be still. in
force since the adoption of the Sales Act.
CoNcLusIoN.
It may seem harsh and undesirable to many persons to allow
a conditional vendor to enforce the condition, reserving title in
himself until full payment of the purchase price, against bona
fide purchasers from, and creditors of, the conditional vendee.
It is permissible, therefore, to point out that this result of the
Sales Act can be remedied by the adoption of a statute such as
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act.3 9 This act would protect
a bonia fide purchaser from a vendee in possession of goods
under a contract of conditional sale; and a creditor of a conditional vendee who had levied on goods as the property of
the latter, ignorant of the fact that such goods were in the
vendee's possession only under a contract of conditional sale,
would also be protected, unless the original contract of conditional sale had been recorded with some designated public offiC This Act was recommended for adoption by the States by the National
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1918. It has been adopted by
Alaska (i919); Arizona (igig); Delaware (i919); New Jersey (1919);
South Dakota (i919); West Virginia (1g92); Wisconsin (i919).
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cial. 40 The result that, would thus be achieved by the adoption
of such a statute would be a distinct improvement over the
Pennsylvania law of conditional sales, as it existed prior to
the adoption of the Sales Act. In Pennsylvania, prior to the
adoption of the Sales Act, although a conditional vendor could
not enforce his title in goods, after they had been delivered into
the possession of the conditional vendee, against innocent third
parties, a bailor could enforce his title in goods, delivered into
the possession of a bailee under a contract of bailment, against
the whole world. The Pennsylvania courts, therefore, apparently considering their law of conditional sales harsh,41 always
held doubtful cases (and some cases that were not doubtful)
to be bailment leases and not contracts of conditional sale.
Transactions which were conditional sales in everything but
name were held to be contracts of bailment. 42 In other words,
"The Uniform Conditional Sales Act provides that, "Every provision in
a conditional sale reserving property in the seller, shall be void as to any
purchaser from or creditor of the buyer, who, without notice of such provision, purchases the goods or acquires by attachement or levy a lien upon
them, before the contract or a copy thereof shall be filed as hereinafter provided, unless such contract or copy is so filed within ten days after the making of the conditional sale."
'For example, the following quotation from Keystone Watch Case Co.
v. Fourth Street National Bank, I94 Pa. 535, 45 AtI. 328 (i9oo), is in point:
"In the eighty years that have elapsed since the decision of Clow v. Woods,
5 S. & R. 275, the rigor of the rule laid down in that case, and it is the leading one in this State, has been greatly relaxed; nor, considering the progress
in population and wealth, and the change in methods of conducting business,
could it have been strictly adhered to, without great obstruction to business
and hardship to individuals. Under that ruling, the cases were rare, where,
as to creditors, the ownership of chattels could be in one and the possession
in another; in such circumstances, with few exceptions, the transaction was
constructively fraudulent as to creditors. But, in the long line of cases following it, step by step, the rule has been so softened, that now, it may be said,
with few exceptions, where the purpose of the contracting parties was, as
between themselves, an honest one, and there was no concealment as to creditors of its true nature, the contract is not constructively fraudulent; in other
words, the law will be slow to hold the parties scamps, constructively, if the
contract, in view of its purpose, was actually an honest one."
' See for example. Rowe v. Sharp, 51 Pa. 26 (i865); Enlow v. Klein,
7o Pa. 488 (1875); Dando v. Foulds, io5 Pa. 7? (1884); Ditman v. CottreU
& Sons, 125 Pa. bo6. 17 Atl. 504 0889) ; Lippincott v. Scott, 198 Pa. 283, 47
Atl. iI15 (190T); Stiles v. Seaton, 2oo Pa. i4, 49 At. 774 (i9o1); Link
Machinery Co. v. Continental Trust Co., 227 Pa. 37, 75 At]. 985 (191o);
Jones v. Wands, i Pa. Super. _69 (1896); Rieker v. Koechling, 4 Pa. Super.
286 (1897); Porter v. Duncan, 23 Pa. Super. 58 (19O3); Miller v. Douglas,
32 Pa. Super. i58 (igo6); Reading Auto Co. v. De Haven, 53 Pa. Super.
344 (1913).

CONDITIONAL SALES IN PENNSYLVANIA

although declaring that the condition in a contract of conditional sale, reserving title in the vendor until full payment of
the purchase price, was unenforceable against bona fide purchasers from, and creditors of, the conditional vendee, when the
latter was in possession of the goods; yet, in fact, the Pennsylvania courts were enforcing such conditions by the expedient of calling the contract one of bailment, and not one of
conditional sale. This result, however, would be impossible
under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, since there is included in its definition of the term "conditional sale", "any,
contract for the bailment or leasing of goods by which the
bailee or lessee contracts to pay as compensation a sun substantially equivalent to the value of the goods, and by which
it is agreed that the bailee or lessee is bound to become, or has
the option of becoming, the owner of such goods upon full compliance with the terns of the contract."' 43 A real protection
against secret conditional sales would thus be furnished, instead
of the somewhat illusory protection that existed in Pennsylvania
prior to the adoption of the Sales Act. The desirability of enacting such a statute is indicated by the fact that thirty-two
states have enacted either the Uniforn Conditional Sales Act,
4
or a statute of a similar nature.
The conclusions of this article may be briefly summarized
as follows: In Pennsylvania, since the adoption -of the Sales
Act, a conditional vendor may enforce the condition in the contract of conditional sale, reserving title in himself until full payment of the purchase price, after the delivery of the goods into
the possession of the conditional vendee, against a bona fide
purchaser from, or a creditor of, the conditional vendee.
Paul A. Mueller.
Lancaster, Pennsylvania.
'Section x of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act.
"The following States have adopted either the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act or a similar statute: Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Vermont Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Wyoming.

